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"RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION": 1 
CAPUTO, DERRIDA, AND THE VIOLENCE 
o 
OF PARTICULARITY-
Shane R. Cudney 
Jack Caputo's most recent book follows Derrida in proposing a "religion with-
out religion", a posture that, while committed to the general structure of reli-
gion, attempts to philosophically distance itself from specific, historical exempli-
fications of that structure. I propose that by determining what motivates the 
distinction between what is termed the "messianic" and "messianisms", a space 
opens that allows us to call into question this "desert religion." I will conclude 
by suggesting an alternative posture, one that attempts to honor both the univer-
sal structure of religion, and the particular, historical content of religion. 
"The question is not whether there is a desir de Dieu, a passion for 
God in Jacques Derrida. Who could ever doubt that? .. The question 
is, rather, the one put by his North African "compatriot" 5t. 
Augustine: "What do I love when I love my God?" Upon the 
groundless ground of this beautiful and bottomless question ... 
Derrida's life and work is an extended commentary.'" 
INTRODUCTION: Religion Without Religion 
In his most recent book, The Prayers and Tears of Jacqul's Derrida, John 
Caputo returns to a careful and sensitive, indeed, surprising re-reading of 
"Derrida's later, more autobiographical pieces,"4 a rendering which 
emphasizes that "[w]e will read him [Derrida] less and less well unless we 
hear the [deeply religious] yes that punctuates and accents the text, the yes 
to the promise that resonates throughout all his works, a yes first, a yes 
last, a constant yes. Qui, oui."" Anticipating the blow that his "academic 
colleagues" and "secularizing friends" no doubt will suffer from the very 
idea of linking Derrida with religion, people "for whom the only blasphe-
my is infidelity to Nietzsche, whom I will have shocked and traumatized 
by this provocative scene of Derrida weeping at his pril'-Dil'll," Caputo 
begs their pardon and implores their forgiveness in advance." 
In a passionate, deconstructive bid to avoid the violence associated with 
traditional, content-full "religions of the Book"/ Caputo, following 
Derrida, proposes an alternative "religion without religion", a posture that, 
while committed to the gl'nl'ral structure of religion, attempts to distance 
itself from the Spl'cijzc historical exemplifications of that structure. In the 
same way that a flower defies the rigid dictates of a concrete jungle and 
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finds its way to the surface in an affirmative burst of life, deconstruction is 
in the business of insinuating itself into the cracks and crevices of the pre-
sent in a way that "works the provocation of what is to come, '" against the 
complacency of the present, against the pleasure the present takes in itself, 
in order to prevent it from closing in on itself, from collapsing into self-
identity.'" So strained and bent are the sails of deconstruction "toward 
what is coming," so deep runs "its posture of expectancy, its passion for the 
impossible," that it would be "absolutely" impossible for the messiah to 
arrive in the flesh." This is the "law of the impossible, the 'impossible-
rule,'" which means "never to confuse his coming (venue) with being pre-
sent, ... never to collapse the coming of the just one into the order of what is 
present or absent."lO 
But what are we to make of this religion without religion, of what 
Caputo will refer to as a religion of the desert; what are we to do with this 
region that is haunted by the ghost of a bloodless and bodiless messiah? 
What are we to "think" of the attempt to relegate religion to the realm of 
reason alone,'} the desire to confine its content within the bounds of a cer-
tain abstraction?}2 Is not the attempt to "bracket" all doxa, a posture which 
is itself committed to a certain ideal that inevitably harbors determinate 
features? How is one able to maintain a universal religion without driving 
a wedge between faith (pistis) and faith(s)? Considering that deconstruc-
tion emphasizes the retrieval of a full-bodied existence from a tradition 
that has often sacrificed the particular (body) on the altar of the universal 
(ideal), these are curious anomalies, to be sure. 
In this paper, 1 propose that by determining the motive behind what I 
will argue is a (philosophical) rift between the "messianic" and Abrahamic 
"messianisms", we will be able to catch a glimpse of the elusive specter 
that animates the deconstructive gesture, an "in-site" that will allow us to 
call into question this "desert religion"," Of, if you will, '''prophetic post-
modernism. "'}4 In so doing, I will suggest that something new is able to 
emerge, a radicalized, post-Kierkegaardian-type faith, one might say, root-
ed in the suffering love of God, one that repeats the possibility of religion 
within the limits of faith, and faith within the limits religion. This 
remythologized myth of justice attempts the "impossible": to honor both 
the universal structure of religion and the particular, historical instantia-
tions of that structure. 
1. 011 the "Messianic" and "Messianislns" 
Part III (The Messianic) of Prayers and Tears is arguably the heart of 
Caputo's text, not only because it is here that we feel its prophetico-mes-
sianic pulse, but also because it is here that we find Caputo holding 
Derrida's hand to the fire of religion, a gesture he believes is necessary if 
deconstruction is to be consistently deconstructive, that is, true to its origi-
nal ideals, faithful to its "founding vision," if we can say such things. 
Because of his increasing concern for those who fall through the cracks 
and get crushed by the political and religious power structures that be, his 
hyper-sensitivity to the violence done in the name of particular "mes-
sianisms" of the Marxist, neo-Hegelian, Islamic or Christian type, Derrida, 
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like Levinas before him, began by the early 1990s to think in terms of of a 
general "messianic" structure, "one that is cut to fit the hand of deconstruc-
tion."15 By 1994, however, Caputo observes that between the two editions 
of "The Force of Law"16 Derrida had sharpened the edges of deconstruc-
tion on the whetstone of Marxism which produced a messianic structure 
that took on the form of a more conventional universal, one that seemed 
more distant from the nitty-gritty of particularity. With a raised eyebrow, 
yet with a religious reverence, Jack the "bookkeeper" has taken it upon 
himself to follow Jack the "ragpicker"17 with an outstretched hand, waiting 
to catch him lest he fall into the ditch of old philosophical debates that 
deconstruction is supposed to gingerly avoid. In this "game of Jacks"18 one 
might irreverently say that Jack is watching out for Jack's derriere. 
In final pages of Specters of Marx lq Derrida elaborates on the distinction 
between the messianic and messianisms by posing the following question in 
a certain, straightforward kind-of way that seems to tum, as Caputo sug-
gests, on the classical distinction between form and content, between the Lmi-
versal and the particular, "between a 'universal' structure and the concrete 
realization or embodiment of that struchrre, between ... 'a structure of experi-
ence' and a 'religion."'2o Derrida formulates the question as follows: "If the 
messianic appeal belongs properly to a universal structure ... how is one to 
think it with the figures of Abraham[icl messianism,,?n But, on Derrida's 
own terms, this is a less than adequate formulation. 22 Indeed, are we really to 
believe that Derrida has finally come home (Heim) to roost? Has he not 
spent his entire life attempting to deprive us of the familiar creature comforts 
of home? Yet, given this present formulation, Derrida does seem to pose 
two possibilities: either the messianic structure precedes the concrete mes-
sianism as an "originary condition," or, the concrete messianisms come 
before the messianic struchlfe as its origin. "Does Abrahamic messianism 
serve as the source or origin from which we derive an abstract concept of the 
messianic? Or is the messianic a condilion of possibility that antedates the 
concrete messianisms which are but exemplifications of it"?23 
What is important to emphasize, especially for the purpose of our discus-
sion, is that these questions bear not only on the relationship between faith, 
religion and philosophy but also on the nahue of the pre-theoretical com-
mitments that undergird and infuse all of our theoretical endeavors. And 
while there are distinct religio-prophetic overtones in Derrida's use of this 
distinction, the very attempt to keep religion(s) at bay-a gap that Caputo 
will creatively try to negotiate24-betrays a certain alliance with the Western 
tradition that needs to be teased out and questioned. By attempting to sus-
pend the content that faith itself entails, is it possible that Derrida (and 
Caputo) paradoxically conflates religion and faith? And could it be that the 
very move which paves the way for his structural religion, is one that har-
bours a motive similar to that which gave rise to the traditional distinction 
between faith and philosophy? We will return to these questions below. 
So, the aforementioned Derridean dilemma, Caputo observes, leads us 
back to a similar Heideggerian (Marburgian) formulation: 
Can there be an "atheological heritage" of the biblical messianisms? 
Can one strip the biblical messianisrns down to an atheological core? 
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Can one, by a work of "desertification" and denuding, by a decon-
structive ascesis, remove a biblical surface from a messianic structure?25 
In other words, the question is whether Derrida's quasi-atheistic, messianic 
is the condition for biblical messianisms,26 or an aftereffect, a distillation 
derived from particular religious accounts, in which case, "[t]he messianic 
in general would be a conceptual ghost, a specter of philosophy, a poor 
abstraction, whose cash value is drawn from the accounts of the religions 
of the Book."27 
In Derrida's own (English) words, he emphasizes the difficulty that sur-
rounds his "religion without religion", a problem that he promises to 
return to, but constantly defers. 
The problem remains ... whether the religions, say, for 
instance, the religions of the Book, are but specific examples of this 
general structure of messianicity. There is the general structure of 
messianicity, as a structure of experience, and on this groundless 
ground there have been revelations, a history which one calls 
Judaism or Christianity and so on. That is one possibility, and then 
you would have a Heideggerian gesture, in style. You would have 
to go back from these religions to the fundamental ontological con-
ditions of possibilities of religion, to describe the structure of mes-
sianicity on the ground of groundless ground on which religions 
have been made possible. 
That is one hypothesis. The other hypothesis - and I confess 
that I hesitate between these two possibilities - is that the events of 
revelation ... have been absolute events, irreducible events which 
have unveiled this messianicity. We would not know what messian-
icity is without messianism, without these events which were 
Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ, and so on. In that case singular 
events would have unveiled or revealed these universal possibilities 
and it is only on that condition that we can describe messianicity.28 
Although Derrida insists that there exists a certain complementarity 
between these two possibilities, and that he oscillates between them, I sug-
gest that he unwittingly favours one of his sons because it "impossible" not 
to, given, that is, my reading of the assumption that underlies the formula-
tion. On the surface, at least, what allows Derrida to linger on the thresh-
old between these two spaces, in the manner he believes he can, is the 
notion that religious faith and philosophy are quite distinct from one 
another. Because the philosopher can only say so much, eventually philos-
ophy pushes against the limits of its horizon, beyond which only faith and 
angels dare to tread. Indeed, whoever or whatever is calling must remain 
anonymous and this anonymity is the horizon of faith. The undecidability 
that surrounds the above distinction between which Derrida oscillates, 
exists primarily because we are dealing here with philosophical knowledge 
which by definition excludes religious faith. Even though Derrida and 
Caputo insist that a religious-like trust undergirds and precedes our theo-
rizing, their language betrays a certain "commitment" to, or shall we say, 
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faith in, a rather traditional distinction. The assumption that gives shape to 
this posture I will deal with in section Ill. 
While Caputo is rightly concerned about the drift of deconstruction, and 
has plotted in his own course, adjusting his sail accordingly, my hunch is 
that because he too sees determinate religions through the lens of a reli-
gious (overarching?) structure, he is unable to pull away from Derrida's 
wake. 
II. On the Disjunction Between the "Messianic" and "Messianisms" 
Not completely content then with swabbing the deck of the Good ship 
"messianic" which purportedly leads to justice, a justice that is always to 
come, Caputo has, in the spirit of Radical Hermeneutics/9 launched out for 
himself in order to situate himself on the side of the deconstructive strait 
that is closest to Kierkegaard. Inspired by the spirit of deconstruction and 
religious faith, Caputo has cause to question Derrida's recent formulation 
of the messianic and the implicit "either/ or" assumptions which are begin-
ning to leak from it. In an effort to rescue deconstruction from being 
drawn into "old debates" that would pull it into the whirlpool of some sort 
of Jewish or even Judea-Christian philosophy, Caputo insists that these 
"two standpoints complement rather than compete with each other and it 
is not a matter of choosing between them."lo As we have already alluded, 
it is because deconstruction "constitutes a certain anti-essentialism or nom-
inalism" that Caputo is worried that Derrida's formulation of the question 
problematizes the whole discussion by framing it "within an assured set of 
distinctions ... which is the whole point of deconstruction to disturb. For 
deconstruction ... ought not to be drawn into any debates about whether 
facts precede essences or essences precede facts, or whether each precedes 
the other but in different orders and in different ways."3! 
According to Caputo, if we pay close attention to Derrida's "'absolute 
events"'l2 we will see that he means something which is not a specific 
instance of something more general. "In the messianic time of singulari-
ties, historical happenings are idiosyncratic 'events' and not 'moments' in a 
larger, teleological or eschatological movement."" Moreover, given the 
"Babelianism of deconstruction and its delimitation of the traditional idea 
of translation... Derrida can hardly put himself in the position of saying 
that the 'messianic' represents the overarching, universal, metalanguage 
into which the various concrete messianisms can be translated."34 The 
matter does get muddled, however, when Derrida goes so far as to say that 
he is in search of "a universal culture of singularities"/5 "where every 
other is wholly other." In this case one must ask with Caputo: what kind 
of universality does he have in mind here? Indeed, how can he avoid 
employing a good-old-fashioned universal in all of this? The question of 
how one is to "describe the status of this indeterminability, this indeter-
minable messianic ... which cannot be a true or conventional or garden 
variety universal",'6 is the challenge. 
Faced with the seeming incommensurability of these competing possi-
bilities, Caputo pulls the notion of "formal indication" from his erstwhile 
Heideggerian hat in order to remedy the situation. This notion, he tells us, 
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unlike the traditional philosophical concept which attempts to encompass 
and comprehend its object, is purportedly a nonobjectifying indicator, "a 
projective sketch that traces out in advance certain salient features of an 
entity or region of entities .... The formal indication is not a universal that 
'contains' 'particulars' 'underneath' it, but a sign ... pointing to a region 
where it itself cannot enter.")e Caputo is convinced that because the "for-
mal indication" is akin to the factical (immanent) region, it has no transcen-
dental compulsion to control and contain the particulars in a universal 
meta-net. Understanding the factical requires then a certain Einstellung, a 
comportment which leaves philosophy to its own devices, whilst a 
detached, philosophically and religiously stripped, ethically sensitive ques-
tioning attitude breaks through, in Heidegger's case, into the "prephilo-
sophical" "'revolutionary' experiences" of "the New Testament and the 
Nichomachean Ethics." 38 
Based as it is on the fundamental distrust, indeed, violence of philosophi-
cal discourse, Heidegger employed his notion of formal indication in the 
business of incessantly questioning traditional categories of thought. Thus, 
he attempted to forge, as Caputo says, "a quasi-conceptuality, formed of 'for-
mal indications' which are related to the singularity of existence, to factical 
life, as imperfect sketches or anticipatory foreshadowings of a prior and irre-
ducible excess, an excess that can only be 'engaged' or entered into existen-
tially, not grasped conceptually."N Because the particular is not taken as an 
inferior chip off the universal block, because "the singular is not a fall (casus) 
from universality whose feet are soaked by the particularity of matter or 
potency,""" Caputo sees this Heideggerian gesture as one that might moisten 
Derrida's parched lips enough to bring him out of a state of heat exhaustion 
which has induced these very spooky and disturbing hallucinations. 
On this account, the messianic would be a more benevolent, modest uni-
versal, one that has no pretensions, no illusions of grandeur. However, says 
Caputo, there is a certain price one pays in travelling the low road of factici-
ty. For if Derrida were to steadfastly follow this less trodden, more difficult 
path, he would have to concede that the messianic is historically condi-
tioned, which means that he would have to admit, indeed, "confess" that it 
harbors "determinable features",.! which in turn levels the ground to the 
extent that his "religion without religion" would be ushered into the realm 
of competing messianisms. "So rather than taking Derrida's messianic as in 
any way over arching the three historical messianisms of the religions of the 
Book," Caputo thinks it is more helpful to see it as "one more messianism 
but with a deconstructive twist .... "H "After all," insists Caputo, 
the Derridean messianic does have certain determinable features, 
some of which ... it has borrowed from the prophetic tradition, and 
some of which are Derrida's own invention. For Derrida's messianic 
is through and through an ethico-political idea, having to do all the 
way down with justice and a democracy to come, and organized 
under the idea of the "new International." Having begun, like every-
one else, and just as he himself predicts, where one is ... Derrida's 
messianic has emerged under determinate historical conditions and 
takes a determinate form:' 
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III. On the Motive for the Disjunction Between the" 
Messianic" and "Messiamisms" 
In all of this Caputo has rightly and inventively attempted to undo the 
dilemma that deconstruction seems to have worked itself into. That Caputo 
has, it seems paradoxically, opened some breathing room between the two 
"spaces" with the help of Heidegger's formal indication there is little doubt. 
The question is: Is this necessarily a better way to keep the future from being 
closed off? Is this enough of a departure from Derrida to make a difference? 
Must we conclude that to minimize the inevitable violence of particular mes-
sianisms, one must "formalize" or bracket out religion? Although in Prayers 
and Tears Caputo presents us with a demythologized Heidegger who has 
received deconstructive "treatments," what concerns me about this alterna-
tive are the assumptions that undergird the idea that there exists some 
"nonobjectifying," "atheistic," "quasi," or "certain" kind of language, a way 
of thinking or poeticizing that is able to pull away from and, in effect, detach 
(or, at the very least, distance) itself from the violence of discourse. 
While Caputo's version of the messianic is no doubt a more humble, 
modest universal, I maintain that because it drinks from the same philo-
sophical cistern as Derrida, it does not, indeed, cannot sufficiently loosen 
the ties that presently bind deconstruction. So even though Caputo has 
kept the philosophical dust from settling (something he does quite well), it 
seems to me that his "neutered" universal, this de-masculinized, gelded, 
more subdued Heideggerianism still cannot genuinely connect with or 
penetrate the surface of concrete religions, even if it can sing a little higher. 
Stripped of its aggressive, violent tendencies, the problem is that this 
docile, more manageable messianic is also stripped of certain, very human, 
gonadian features, which also strikes me as violent. 
Although Caputo assures us that on his accounting the singular is not "a 
fall (casus) from universality," I suggest that the singular is a fall within par-
ticularity.44 This means (a la Heidegger) that because every philosophical 
move, every decision is structurally finite, they are seen as "'cuts,'" incisions 
which necessarily amputate and exclude:5 Indeed, for this reason, the very 
gesture of philosophy is one of violence. With Derrida, Caputo has all 
along maintained that the origin is always already fissured from the begin-
ning, that at the origin of language, prior to empirical violence, there is the 
"arche-violence" of "arche-writing" with its "harsh law of spacing" as "an 
originary accessory and an essential accident.""" As such, that which is con-
stitutive to human be-ing is considered structurally violent. Thus, to be 
human is to be caught in a web of necessary violence. This construal, I sug-
gest, is precisely what binds deconstruction, and what links Caputo and 
Derrida to one another and to the tradition they rightly seek to deconstruct. 
On the surface, at least, the rather obvious reason for the quasi-ascetic, 
linguistic acrobatics and inventions that surround the production of 
Derrida's (and Caputo's) "religion without religion" is the violence that 
determinate "content-full" faiths inevitably inflict in the name of the Law, 
Truth, and Messiahs. No doubt religions of the Book have a disturbing 
legacy of violence, and it for this reason both Derrida and Caputo consider 
it imperative to develop a general structure of justice which highlights a 
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desert-like, ascetic detachment from the historical expressions of such a 
structure. Derrida believes this is necessary, for 
[a]s soon as you reduce the messianic structure to messianism, then 
you are reducing the universality and this has important political con-
sequences. Then you are accrediting one tradition among others and a 
notion of an elected people, of a given literal language, a given funda-
mentalism.47 
The question of structural violence leads us back another step to the ques-
tion of trust (that is, [religious] faith [Pis tis] construed here in the broadest 
possible sense), to the assumption which undergirds and gives shape to the 
motive to develop a general structure of religion. If the general messianic, on 
Derrida's account, is the condition for specific messianisms, is it not also true 
that his belief in this structure presupposes a certain trust, a certain faith in 
the primordiality of the heterogenous, desert-like "placeless displacing 
place"4B called kh6ra, whose sister is the messianic, the place where an a-per-
sonal justice from nowhere resides?49 And if discourse remains grounded in 
faith as Derrida himself confesses in Memoirs of the Blind,S{) is it not possible to 
think otherwise than of "Khora" as the condition for im/posssibility? And 
might not this other birth-space produce different offspring? 
In an attempt to escape the strictures of ousiology, which inevitably har-
bours secrets, Derrida, in his article "How Not to Speak",'1 which Caputo 
highlights, has us trek to the far side of negativity where he explores the 
analogy and the disanalogy of the kh6ra with the God of negative theology, a 
place where we are taken to the very limits of language - and beyond. 
Here Derrida paints a picture of the tension in Plato between what he calls 
the "two movements or two tropics of negativity",'2 the "two opposing ways 
in which philosophical thought finds itself up against its limits ... two things 
equally unsayable but for quite opposite reasons."53 While the first move-
ment presses toward that high hyper-ousiological point above the clouds 
which inspires awe in both Neoplatonists and negative theologians alike, the 
second movement slips under the border of being, below phenomenality, 
beyond the reach of "all anthropo-theological schemes, all history, all revela-
tion, all truth."54 This no-place called kh6ra "is neither form (idea), nor sensi-
ble thing, but the place (lieu) in which the demiurge impresses or cuts images 
of the intelligible paradigms, the place which was already there," a pre-origi-
nary origin from nowhere.55 
Like the owl "Old Brown" in Beatrix Potter's classic who has a penchant 
for honey which lies beyond his means to reach it, Derrida takes a keen 
interest in kh6ra precisely because of its ability to "resist any analogizing or 
participatory schema, to remain adrift and lost."56 "KhOra is neither present 
nor absent, active nor passive, the Good nor evil, living nor nonliving." It 
is "[n]either theomorphic nor anthropomorphic" rather, it is "atheological 
and nonhuman .... "57 Indeed, kh6ra must have no recourse to "meaning", 
"essence", or "identity." Otherwise, in the language of the gift, it becomes 
implicated in the ecomony of exchange where it would take on the appear-
ance of the giver of all good gifts, a giver that no doubt will eventually 
come to collect. This re-inscription into the same goes against the "impos-
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sible-rule" because "the kh6ra is tout autre, very."ss In order then to avoid 
the violence that lurks behind every tree in a "tit for tat," "dog eat dog" 
jungle economy, Oerrida prefers to speak of the aridity of the desert, a 
haunted place where messianic spirits love to hide. 
But (seriously) what are we to make of the non-historical, historical 
names of kh6ra and her sibling the messianic? How are we to "think" of 
this placeless place that cannot be "assimilated into philosophy" or reli-
gion, this place that historical "things do not in any way stain or mark," 
that "belongs to a time out mind, out of memory," out of sight?59 Through 
this lens, one can certainly see why Derrida and Caputo cannot say 
whether kh6ra gives or does not give, and why one must ask: "What do I 
love when I love my God, God or klz{)ra? How are we to decide? 00 we 
have to choose?"60 As I suggested earlier, what this produces is the notion 
that philosophy can only say so much. Because the philosopher can say 
only so much, philosophy itself eventually pushes against the limits of its 
horizon, a point at which philosophy is a little lost for words and finds 
itself beginning to stutter as it looks for the exit sign. 
As far back as Radical Hermeneutics,'" Caputo articulated this same senti-
ment when he emphasized that one cannot say whether Nietzsche (the 
tragic) or Kierkegaard (the religious) is right because philosophy is not in 
the business of making this kind of decision. Not surprisingly. this same 
distinction is re-peated in Against Ethics where Caputo once again is 
backed into a philosophical corner when he finds himself unable to say 
who or what it is that calls, il or il y a. 62 Things happen, Caputo says, 
"[t]hey happen 'because' (weil) they happen .... There is no 'why' .... What 
happens is what there is (es gibt). That is all."63 In Caputo's latest work, the 
distinction re-peats itself once again in the form of "religion without reli-
gion" a messianic without messianisms. Faith in, or "passion for the 
impossible," as he calls it, must keep the messianic in the realm of the viens 
for once we pull justice into the realm of the possible it is given over to dis-
tortion and violence, a place where "moth and rust doth corrupt." 
On my reading, the way Caputo slices the pie (something we all of 
course do if we want a piece) is reminiscient of a Thomistic gesture which 
dictates that faith remain extrinsic to philosophy. If it is true that humanity 
is insatiably religious, if we are fundamentally creatures of faith, whose 
profound experience of both the brokenness and the goodness of life find 
us hoping and praying, spiralling and re-peating forward, it is difficult to 
imagine faith being absent from or extrinsic to any mode of being-in-the-
world. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a "call" without a "gift," a "yes" with-
out the strings that a symbiotic relationship necessarily entails. 
It seems to me that even though Caputo and Oerrida posit a "gift," a 
religio-ethical "yes" which comes before all of life and language, this "yes" 
is in danger of being nullified, swallowed up by a Barthian-like "No" 
which is posited against any and all determinate commitments. If it is true 
that this Ankhoral"No" is synonymous with Oerrida's fractured pre-origi-
nary origin, from whence comes love and the possibility of justice? And if 
justice is always to come, always "impossible," how is it that evil and vio-
lence are not conflated with goodness and thereby put on equal footing? 
What else can we make of the kind of violence that" always crosses the dis-
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tance of the other," a violence that permeates and "violates the space of the 
other .... "? Is not this kind of "radical evil" the stuff on which deconstruc-
tion's "desert, kh6ral, ankh6ral religion stands or falls .... "?64 
It seems clear that what we are left with here is a justice that is relegated 
to the realm of chance, and manifests itself only as a random flash-in-the-
pan event that immediately burns up upon entering our atmosphere. 
What kind of justice is this? Must the beautiful thought of justice turn 
immediately ugly upon its arrival? Might there be another "possibility," 
another way to navigate the deconstructive strait between the messianic 
and messianism, another way to prevent the future from being closed off? 
While Derrida and Caputo believe that their structural religion is the 
cleanest dirty way to keep the future open, what bothers me is the same 
thing that troubles me as a parent who, more often than not, finds myself in 
the frustratring position of saying to my kids the very things that my father 
said to me, things that I vowed I would never say. Somehow, in some 
insidious way they ooze out, betraying a familial bond that runs deeper 
than we would sometimes like to think. In deconstruction's zeal to purge 
philosophy of its violence, I hear other voices, a cacophony of past and pre-
sent voices, one of which it seems to me sanctions a neo-Scholastic bifurca-
tion that, in its deconstructive expression, relegates religious faith to a place 
that excludes it as a mode of knowing. Though, admittedly, faith knowing 
cannot be reduced to philosophical knowing, I do suggest that faith perme-
ates every mode of human experience. Whether we are witnessing a beau-
tiful sunset, smelling cowslips in the field, or reflecting on Kierkegaard's 
Concept of Anxiety, are we not always already surrendering to the experience 
of the world which is the very condition of knowing the world? 
CONCLUSION: Religion Within Faith 
While I have no doubt that an affirmative, indeed, religio-ethical "yes" 
marks the texts of both philosophers, it seems to me that this bitesized 
"yes" inevitably gets swallowed up in the "heterodidactics between life 
and death."6s If this is the case, might it be possible to enlarge this "yes"? 
Is it possible that this affirmative "yes," can be re-thought of as an 
(inter)personal, life-giving "yes"? And could we say that this "yes" is syn-
onymous with love, a love which is the oxygen that is the very condition 
for the possibility of all our particular faith(s), whatever they might be? 
This shift in emphasis would highlight the reality that, because we live 
in a world of both connection and disconnection, it is not a matter of oscil-
lating back and forth in a volatile, quasi-neutral space between two 
absolutes, attempting to escape the tyranny of two despots, being spooked 
(Es spllkt) 66 by the "ghost of full presence.""? The focus, instead, would 
become more persistently ethical, becoming a question, not of how one is 
to escape violence, but of how one is to respond to the call of love. Indeed, 
in this economy, the call of love is at once a "gift" that compels us to 
respond, and a "caU" that can be ignored, refused and abused. 
Moreover, this shift would radicalize the notion of undecidability by 
highlighting the reality that human beings are inherently religious. As crea-
tures of faith who are always already caught in the grip of precariously held 
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beliefs, it makes good ethical sense to bring our particular faiths to the fore 
and confess them (in "fear and trembling"). It is here, in plain view, that we 
"myth-makers" will be better able to keep our stories, and their potential for 
violence, in check. 
Although Caputo remains religiously committed to his Ankh6ral 
Religion of withdrawal, which implicates him in Derrida's dilemma, this 
is not an altogether bad thing on my reading. For by conceding that 
Derrida's absolute desert is unlivable, and that the messianic hope cannot 
live apart from the determinable faiths, Caputo's analysis not only allows 
for a certain content, it also admits of a certain genealogy and geogra-
phy68 which helps bring the messianic closer to the messianisms. For 
despite his protestations to the contrary, Derrida's "religion" has very 
determinable features which include an affinity for a particular form of 
democracy and a very specific brand of prophetic justice.6<J Indeed, 
deconstruction itself was forged" at the end of the totalitarianisms of the 
left and the right, of fascism and Stalinism .... "70 
If this is the case, if we allow Caputo to have his way with Derrida, if we 
admit content into Derrida's messianic structure (will he forgive us?), then 
the ground would level out to the extent that, not only would the messianic 
become a pharmacological site - and therefore be subject to deconstruction -
but concrete messianisms, by the same token, could not be written off as 
essentially poisonous. This, as we have already alluded, highlights the crucial 
difference between "necessary" violence and "historical" violence. Allowing 
for the ubiquity of violence rather than the necessity of violence opens "a 
political space which can grapple with both the possibility of peace and vio-
lence - that is, a political structure that confronts violence as violence precise-
ly against a horizon of possible peace and justice."7l So instead of having 
deterrrtinate religions be the whipping boy of the messianic, the messianic 
itself is also ushered into the "beauti ful fray" as another messianism among 
messianisms. In this way, we could release religion to be understood as "a 
fundamentally deconstructive gesture," yet also a pharmacological site 
where there exists the possibility "of both poison and cure, violence and 
peace, exclusion and healing."n In other words, if Derrida cannot have his 
cake and eat it too, if it is impossible to maintain his desert religion, and if we 
also confess that all discourse begins in faith, then instead of dismissing out 
of hand the viability of determinate religions in the call for justice, we would 
be free to bring our particular faiths to the fore in order to cultivate a religio-
ethical vigilance that has an ear bent toward the other. 
Was not this kind of vigilance demonstrated, for example, by a certain 
Galilean who by his own account was both prophet and priest, both human 
and divine, whose kingdom is both "now" and "not yet," and whose "par-
ticular" words and work are "universal" in intent and scope? 
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